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In this paper, we investigate the representability of a family of theories as the set of extensions of a
default theory. First, we present both new necessary conditions and sufficient ones for the representabil-
ity by means of general default theories, which improves on similar results known before. Second, we
show that one always obtains representable families by eliminating countably many theories from a
representable family. Finally, we construct two examples of denumerable, representable families; one
is not supercompactly nonincluding, and the other consists of mutually inconsistent theories but fails
to be represented by a normal default theory. C° 2001 Academic Press
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1. INTRODUCTION
Reiter’s default logic [12] is one of the most prominent formalizations of nonmonotonic reasoning,
and is extensively investigated by the community of logical foundations of artificial intelligence [1, 2,
4, 5, 7, 15, 16]. A default theory 1 describes a collection of formula sets, namely the family of all
extensions of 1, which represents a family of belief sets of a reasoning agent. An important issue is,
then, to characterize those families of sets that can be represented as the set of extensions for a certain
default theory. This issue is called the representation theory for default logic.
Several significant contributions have been made to the representation theory for default logic (see,
for example, [8–11, 14]). In particular, the case for default theories with a finite set of defaults and the
case for normal default theories were addressed successfully. However, the infinite, nonnormal case is
considered a rather hard open problem [11]. This paper aims at tackling this hard problem.
By ext(1) we denote the family of all extensions of a default theory1. There is a well-known constraint
on the family ext(1) obtained first by Reiter [12] that such a family must be nonincluding. Moreover,
Marek et al. [11] showed that if a finite family is nonincluding, then it can be represented by a default
theory. Unfortunately, this is not true for infinite families as they actually constructed a denumerable
family of nonincluding theories [11] that is not representable. In this paper, we present a new necessary
condition for those families that can be represented by default theories. In addition, we present sufficient
conditions for representability for infinite families of theories, which are much weaker than those in [11].
We further address the representability problem with respect to subfamilies of a representable family.
The family of extensions of a normal default theory is not only nonincluding, but all its members are
pairwise inconsistent [12]. Again, this stronger constraint could not fully characterize those families
of theories representable by normal default theories. Marek and Truszczyn´ski [9] raised an interesting
question: Is the family ext(1) of all extensions of a default theory 1 representable by a normal default
theory under the conditions that ext(1) is not empty with all its members mutually inconsistent?2 Marek
et al. [11] constructed an example of a denumerable family of pairwise inconsistent theories that are
not representable by normal default theories. However, this example is not representable by any default
theory and thus does not answer the question above. In this paper, we construct another denumerable
family of pairwise inconsistent theories, which is representable by a default theory but not by any normal
default theory, and hence we answer this question negatively.
1 This work has been supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants 60073056 and
69733020, the Guangdong Provincial Natural Science Foundation under Grant 001174, the Foundation for University Key
Teachers by the Ministry of Education, and the MOE Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Science in
University.
2 In personal correspondence by e-mail, Marek told the author of this paper that the answer to the question is negative.
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2. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, by L we denote a language of propositional logic with a denumerable set of atoms At .
We denote propositional provability by ‘ and the corresponding consequence operator by Cn. By a
theory we always mean a subset of L closed under propositional provability. Let B be a set of standard
monotone inference rules. As in [9], we obtain a formal proof system (denoted by PCCB) by extending
propositional calculus with the rules from B. The derivations in the system PCC B are built by means
of propositional provability and rules in B. More formally, by a proof in the system PCC B, we mean
any sequence of formulas ’1; : : : ; ’n such that for every i D 1; : : : ; n;
1. ’i stands for a tautology, or is obtained from formulas ’ j and ’k , with j; k < i; by means of
modus ponens, or
2. there is a rule fi
fl
in B such that fi D ’ j , for some j < i and fl D ’i .
The corresponding provability operator is analogously denoted by ‘B and the consequence operator by
CnB(¢).
A default is an expression d of the form fi:0
fl
, where fi and fl are formulas from L and 0 is a finite
list of formulas from L. The formula fi is called the prerequisite of d (p(d), in symbols) and fl is called
the consequent of d (c(d), in symbols). The set of formulas 0 is called the justification set of d and is
denoted by j(d). This terminology is naturally extended to a set of defaults D. Namely, the prerequisite,
consequent, and justification set of D, in symbols p(D), c(D), and j(D), are defined by
p(D) D
[
d2D
fp(d)g; c(D) D
[
d2D
fc(d)g; j(D) D
[
d2D
j(d):
If p(d) is a tautology, d is called prerequisite-free. In such case, p(d) is usually omitted from the
notation of d . If j(d) D fc(d)g, d is called normal. If j(d) D fc(d)^ ° g for some formula ° , d is called
seminormal.
By a default theory we mean a pair1 D (D;W ), where D is a set of defaults and W a set of formulas.
The set W is called the objective part of (D;W ). We say that (D;W ) is a prerequisite-free if all defaults
in D are prerequisite-free, normal if they are normal, and seminormal if they are seminormal.
Following [9], we give an alternative definition of extension, which is proved equivalent to the original
one by Reiter. First, we need the following concepts.
For a default d and a set of defaults D, define
Mon(d) D p(d)
c(d) and Mon(D) D
‰
p(d 0)
c(d 0)
flflflfl d 0 2 D¾ :
Given a set of formulas S, those defaults d such that S 6‘ :° for every ° 2 j(d) are called S-
applicable. A set D of defaults is S-applicable if all its members are S-applicable.
Remark that for every set S of formulas, those defaults with the empty justification set are S-applicable
(even if S is inconsistent), and if a finite set D of defaults is S-applicable, then those default with the
justification set j(D) are S-applicable also.
We define
DS D Mon(fd 2 D : S 6‘ :° for every ° 2 j(d)g):
A theory S is an extension of a default theory (D;W ), if and only if
S D CnDS (W ):
The family of all extensions of (D;W ) is denoted by ext(D;W ).
We now define some key concepts concerning the representability issue for default logic.
DEFINITION 2.1. Two default theories 1 and 10 are said to be equivalent to each other (denoted
by 1 … 10), if they have the same extensions, i.e., ext(1) D ext(10). A default theory is said to be
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representable in a class of default theories if the default theory is equivalent to some default theory in
the class.
DEFINITION 2.2. Let T be a family of theories contained inL. The family is representable by a default
theory1 if ext(1) D T . A family (of theories) is called representable if it is representable by a default
theory.
3. REPRESENTABILITY BY GENERAL DEFAULT THEORIES
We get a necessary condition for extensions of a default theory, which is stronger than the well-
known necessary condition obtained first by Reiter [12] that extensions be pairwise nonincluding. We
then present some sufficient conditions improving on similar conditions known previously (see, for
example, [11, Proposition 3.3, Theorem 4.2]).
To prove these results, we need a lemma allowing us to replace any default theory with an equivalent
default theory in which all defaults are prerequisite-free. This result was obtained independently by
Schaub [17], Bonatti and Eiter [3], and Marek et al. [11]. However, our argument shows that the
equivalent theory can be simpler, in the inference-free form defined as follows.
DEFINITION 3.1. A default theory (D;W ) is called inference-free if
1. The default theory is prerequisite-free.
2. The objective part W is empty.
3. For prerequisite-free defaults d; d 0, if d 2 D and d 0 has the same justification set as d and
c(d 0) is logically inferred from c(d), then d 0 2 D also.
4. For every two defaults d; d 0 in D, the default: j(d) [ j(d 0)=c(d) ^ c(d 0) is also in D.
LEMMA 3.1. For every default theory1 there is an inference-free default theory10 equivalent to1.
Proof. Given a default theory 1 D (D;W ), we define another default theory 10 D (D0; ;)3 as
D0 D
‰
: j(D00)
’
flflflfl’ 2 L; D00 is a finite subset of D and W ‘Mon(D00) ’¾ :
It is trivial to check that the default theory 10 is inference-free. We now prove that 10 is equivalent
to 1; i.e., they have exactly the same extensions. Recalling the definition of an extension, it suffices to
show that, for all sets of formulas S,
CnDS (W ) D CnD0 S (;)
or that for every formula ’,
W ‘DS ’ iff ‘D0S ’:
Assume first that W ‘DS ’. Then there is a finite subset B of DS such that W ‘B ’. There must be,
by the definition of DS , a set D00 of defaults such that Mon(D00) D B and D00 is S-applicable. Hence, the
default : j(D00)=’ is in D0 and is S-applicable. Since Mon(: j(D00)=’) D >=’, where > is a tautology,
we have that the rule >=’ is in D00S , which leads to ‘D0S ’.
To prove the converse implication, assume that ‘D0S ’. Then there must be a finite subset D⁄ of D0
such that all defaults in D⁄ are S-applicable and ‘Mon(D⁄) ’. By the definition of D0, we can assume
that
D⁄ D
‰
: j(D00i )
’i
flflflfl i < n¾ ;
3 By ; we denote the empty set.
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where n is a natural number. Observe that, for each i ,
W ‘Mon(D00i ) ’i :
Moreover, since : j(D00i )=’i is S-applicable, those defaults in D00i are also S-applicable. Observe that
‘Mon(D⁄) ’ is equivalent to f’i j i < ng ‘ ’. Hence,
W ‘
Mon
¡ S
i<n
D00i
¢ ’:
It follows that W ‘DS ’: j
We now introduce three notions of a nonincluding family of sets.
DEFINITION 3.2. LetF be a family of theories. Then we say thatF is nonincluding ifF is an antichain
(that is, for T; T 0 2 F , if T µ T 0 then T D T 0); compactly nonincluding if for every theory E 2 F and
every formula fi 2 E , there exists a finite list of families F0; : : : ;Fk¡1 such that
1.
S
i<k Fi D fT 2 F : fi =2 T g
2. for every i < k, (\Fi ¡ E) 6D ;;
and supercompactly nonincluding if for every theory E 2 F , there exists a finite list of families
F0; : : : ;Fk¡1 such that
1.
S
i<k Fi D F ¡ fEg
2. for every i < k, (\Fi ¡ E) 6D ;:
It is important to remark that the list of families F0; : : : ;Fk¡1 in the last two parts of Definition 3.2
could be empty. In this case, we have that k D 0, and by mathematical conventions,Si<k Fi D ; and it
is trivially true that “for every i < k, (\Fi ¡ E) 6D ;:” Accordingly, the family of a single inconsistent
theory is both compactly nonincluding and supercompactly nonincluding.
Clearly, if a family of theories F is supercompactly nonincluding, then it is compactly nonincluding,
but not vice versa (see the example in the proof of Proposition 5.1). In addition, we have the following
result.
PROPOSITION 3.1. If a family (of theories) is compactly nonincluding, then it is nonincluding.
Proof. Suppose that a family F is compactly nonincluding. We must show it is nonincluding also.
Assume conversely that F1 µ F2 hold for some distinct theories F1; F2 2 F , and hence there exists a
formula fi 2 F2¡F1. By the assumption thatF is compactly nonincluding, there exists a list of families
F0; : : : ;Fk¡1 such that
1.
S
i<k Fi D fT 2 F : fi =2 T g
2. for every i < k, (\Fi ¡ F2) 6D ;:
As fi =2 F1, there is a j < k such that F1 2 F j and hence \F j µ F1. So, by the assumption that
F1 µ F2, we have that \F j ¡ F2 is an empty set, contradicting the latter assertion about Fi s. j
The converse of the above proposition does not necessarily hold. We demonstrate this with an example.
Let fp0; p1 : : :g be a set of propositional atoms. Define Ti D fpi g, i D 0; 1; : : : ; and T D fTi : i D
0; 1; : : :g. It follows immediately that this family T is nonincluding but not compactly nonincluding.
To gain more intuitive impression on these three notions, we restate their definitions using the concept
of a hitting set, which was widely used in the literature (see, for example, [6, 12]). A set H is a hitting
set for a family F of theories if H \ F 6D ; holds for every F 2 F .
PROPOSITION 3.2. Let F be a family of theories.
(a) F is nonincluding iff, for each F 2 F , there is a hitting set for F ¡ fFg that is not a hitting
set for F .
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(b) F is compactly nonincluding iff, for each F 2 F and fi 2 F , there is a finite hitting set for
fT 2 F : fi =2 T g that is not a hitting set for fT 2 F : fi =2 T g [ fFg.
(c) F is supercompactly nonincluding iff, for each F 2 F , there is a finite hitting set forF¡fFg
that is not a hitting set for F .
Proof. The result of (a) follows immediately by the definition.
To prove the “if” part of (b), we can associate each formula ’ j in the hitting set being considered with
the family of those theories that contain the formula. For the “only if” part of (b), given F 2 F andfi 2 F ,
we then get the families F j as in the definition of compact nonincluding. The result follows if we select
a formula fi j in \F j ¡ F for each j and consider the set of those fi j s. This completes the proof of (b).
The proof of (c) is similar to that of (b). j
The next proposition says that the three notions above are equivalent to each other for finite fami-
lies.
PROPOSITION 3.3. Let F be a finite family of theories. Then the following three propositions are
equivalent to each other:
(a) F is nonincluding.
(b) F is compactly nonincluding.
(c) F is supercompactly nonincluding.
Proof. As we have demonstrated already that (a) implies (b) and (b) implies (c), it suffices to prove
(c) implies (a), but this is trivial by Proposition 3.2 and the finiteness of F . j
What follows is a new necessary for families representable by default theories.
THEOREM 3.1. If F is representable by a default theory, then it is compactly nonincluding.
Proof. Suppose that F is representable by a default theory1, E is a theory in F and fi is a formula
in E . By Lemma 3.1, we can assume that1 is inference-free. Let1 D (D; ;). As the extensions of the
default theory (D; ;) are exactly those theories in F , E is an extension of (D; ;). By the definition of
extension, we then have that E D CnDE (;), and hence fi 2 CnDE (;). It follows that there exists a finite
subset D0 of D such that each default in D0 is E-applicable and ‘Mon(D0) fi holds, i.e., c(D0) ‘ fi since
the default theory (D; ;) is inference-free. We now have that the default
dfi D : j(D
0)
fi
2 D:
Suppose that j(D0) consists of fi j s (for j < k). For each fi j , let
F j D fT 2 F j :fi j 2 T and fi =2 T g:
Then F j µ fT 2 F j fi =2 T g. On the other hand, for those T 2 F such that fi =2 T , we have that
fi =2 CnDT (;), which yields that dfi is not T -applicable. Thus there is an fi j such that :fi j 2 T , and we
have that T 2 F j . So we have proved that[
i<k
Fi D fT 2 F j fi =2 T g:
Now we need only to show that, for each j < k, \F j ¡ E is nonempty, but :fi j 2 \F j and :fi j =2 E
(recall that fi j 2 j(D0) and each default in D0 is E-applicable). j
Since a family being compactly nonincluding implies the family nonincluding, we get the following
well-known result [9, 12] as a corollary.
COROLLARY 3.1. If F is representable by a default theory then it is nonincluding.
The converse of Theorem 3.1 does not necessarily hold. In other words, Theorem 3.1 gives a necessary
condition for representable families, but this conditions is not a sufficient one.
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PROPOSITION 3.4. There exists a family that is compactly nonincluding but not representable.
Proof. The result follows from a cardinality argument. There are continuum-many default theories
in the given (denumerable) language, while there are more than continuum-many families that are
compactly nonincluding since there is a default theory 1 with continuum-many extensions and hence
all subsets of ext(1) are compactly nonincluding. j
We wonder whether there exists a denumerable family that is compactly nonincluding family but not
representable.
The next result completely characterizes subfamilies of representable families.
THEOREM 3.2. A family F is a subset of a representable family if and only if it is compactly non-
including.
Proof. The “only if” part follows immediately from Theorem 3.1 and the fact that if a family is
compactly nonincluding, so are its subfamilies. As for the “if” part, assume that a family of theories F
is compactly nonincluding. Given E 2 F and fi 2 E , we obtain, by the assumption above, a finite list
of families F0; : : : ;Fk¡1 such that [
j<k
F j D fT 2 F : fi =2 T g
and for each j < k, there is an fi j such that
fi j 2 (\F j ¡ E):
By dE;fi , we denote the default :f:fi0; : : : ;:fik¡1g=fi. Now consider the default theory (D; ;), where
D D fdT;’ j T 2 F and ’ 2 T g:
We want to prove that T µ ext(D; ;), i.e., for each T 2 F ,
T D CnDT (;):
On one hand, for each ’ 2 T , dT;’ is T -applicable, and ’ 2 CnDT (;). On the other hand, for all
T -applicable defaults dT 0;fi0 , we must prove that fi0 2 T . By the construction of dT 0;fi0 , we can assume
that j(dT 0;fi0 ) D ffi00; : : : ; fi0k 0¡1g, and there are families F 00; : : : ;F 0k 0¡1 such that[
j<k 0
F 0j D fS 2 F : fi0 =2 Sg
and for every j < k 0,
:fi0j 2 \F 0j :
Suppose that fi0 =2 T . Then we would have that T 2 F 0j for some j < k 0. Thus, :fi0j 2 T , contradicting
the assumption that the default dT 0;fi0 is T -applicable. j
We now propose a sufficient condition for the representablity of a family.
THEOREM 3.3. If a family F is supercompactly nonincluding, then it is representable by a default
theory.
Proof. Assume that a family of theoriesF is supercompactly nonincluding. Since the empty family
is representable, we assume further that F is a nonempty family. Given an arbitrary E 2 F , we obtain,
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by the assumption above, a finite list of families F0; : : : ;Fk¡1 such that[
j<k
F j D F ¡ fEg
and for each j < k, there is an fi j such that
fi j 2 (\F j ¡ E):
For each E 2 F , we fix one such finite set of :fi j s, denoted by JE . As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, by
dE;fi , we denote the default :JE=fi. Now consider the default theory (D; ;), where
D D fdT;’ j T 2 F and ’ 2 T g:
We shall prove that F is representable by the default theory (D; ;). First, we show that F µ ext(D; ;).
Given T 2 F , we must prove T D CnDT (;): On one hand, for each ’ 2 T , dT;’ is T -applicable, and
hence ’ 2 CnDT (;). On the other hand, for every T -applicable default dT 0;fi0 in D, we prove fi0 2 T as
follows. By the construction of dT 0;fi0 , we can assume that j(dT 0;fi0 ) D f:fi00; : : : ;:fi0k 0¡1g, and there are
families F 00; : : : ;F 0k 0¡1 such that [
j<k 0
F 0j D F ¡ fT 0g
and for every j < k 0,
fi0j 2 \F 0j :
Suppose that fi0 =2 T . Then we would have that T 6D T 0 for fi0 2 T 0, and hence T 2 F 0j for some j < k 0.
Thus, fi0j 2 T , contradicting the assumption that the default dT 0;fi0 is T -applicable.
Now, we show that F ¶ ext(D; ;). Given an E 2 ext(D; ;), we must prove E 2 F .
Without loss of generality, we assume that E 6D Cn(;); otherwise, all extensions of (D; ;) are
Cn(;), and the result follows since F µ ext(D; ;) and F 6D ;. As E D CnDE (;) 6D Cn(;), there is an
E-applicable default dT 0;fi0 in D, where T 0 2 F . Hence, for all ’0 2 T 0, dT 0;’0 is also E-applicable. This
leads to ’0 2 CnDE (;) D E . Thus, T 0 µ E . As a result, T 0 D E since we have proved that T 0 is an
extension of (D; ;). This completes the proof. j
Again, the converse of Theorem 3.3 does not hold. In Section 5, we will actually construct a denu-
merable family that is representable by a default theory but is not supercompactly nonincluding.
We say that a family F of theories has a strong system of distinct representatives (SSDR) if for every
T 2 F there is a formula ’T 2 T that does not belong to any other theory in F (see [11]).
PROPOSITION 3.5. If a family F of theories is compactly nonincluding and has an SSDR then it is
supercompactly nonincluding.
Proof. Suppose that F is a compactly nonincluding family that has an SSDR. By the definition, for
each E and fi 2 E , there exists a finite list of families F0; : : : ;Fk¡1 such that[
j<k
F j D fT 2 F : fi =2 T g;
and for each j < k,
(\F j ¡ E) 6D ;:
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Consider the case where fi is the formula ’T 2 T , which does not belong to any other theory in F .
It follows immediately that F is supercompactly nonincluding, since we have that
fT 2 F : ’T =2 T g D F¡fEg: j
As a corollary of Theorem 3.3 and the proposition above, we obtain another sufficient condition for
the representablity of a family.
COROLLARY 3.2. If a family F is representable by a default theory, then every family G µ F that
has an SSDR is representable by a default theory.
Corollary 3.2 improves a closely related result in [11].
COROLLARY 3.3 [11, THEOREM 4.2]. If a family F is representable by a default theory and has an
SSDR, then every family G µ F is representable by a default theory.
Proof. The result follows immediately from the fact that if a family F has an SSDR, so does every
subfamily of F . j
The result of [11, Theorem 4.2] essentially says that a family that has an SSDR is representable under
the condition that it is a subfamily of a representable family that has an SSDR, while Corrollary 3.2
weakens the condition by that it is a subfamily of a representable family. In the next section, we shall
improve the result of [11, Theorem 4.2] in another direction.
4. ELIMINATING COUNTABLY MANY EXTENSIONS
In this section, we address the representablity problem with respect to subfamilies of a representable
family. Marek et al. [11] showed that if F is representable by a default theory and has an SSDR, then
every subfamily of F is also representable by a default theory. Note that every family that has an SSDR
must be countable. We surprisingly show that the above result of Marek et al. still holds if we replace
the condition that F has an SSDR simply by that F is a countable family.
THEOREM 4.1. Let F be representable by a default theory, and let F 0 µ F be countable. Then
G D F ¡ F 0 is also representable by a default theory.
Proof. Suppose that F is a representable family and E0; : : : ; E j ; : : : are theories in F . We must
prove that F ¡ fE0; : : : ; E j ; : : :g is representable.
First, we can assume, by Lemma 3.1, that F is representable by an inference-free default theory
(D; ;).
Since the theories in F are nonincluding, for every number j and every i < j , there is a formula ’i; j
such that ’i; j 2 E j and ’i; j =2 Ei . Thus, the formula ’0; j ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ ’ j¡1; j , denoted by ’ j , is in E j , but
not in Ei for each i < j . For convenience, let ’0 be a fixed tautological formula.
To construct a default theory such that all its extensions are exactly those in F ¡ fE0; : : : ; E j ; : : :g,
we introduce some notations. Let g be a fixed encoding function for defaults in D; thus, for each default
d 2 D, g(d) is the unique encoding number of d. For a finite subset D0 of D, by m(D0) we denote the
default in D0 with the largest encoding number.
For a default d 2 D, by Nd , we denote the set of those natural numbers k such that there is a finite
subset D0 of D satisfying that
1. every default in D0 is Ek-applicable,
2. c(D0) ‘ ’k ,
3. d D m(D0):
Note that for each finite subset D0 of D, there is at most one k satisfying the first two properties. To
prove this, suppose that for another k 0, every default in D0 is Ek 0 -applicable and c(D0) ‘ ’k 0 . Then both
c(D0) µ CnDEk0 (;) D Ek 0 and c(D0) µ CnDEk (;) D Ek hold, and hence both Ek 0 ‘ ’k and Ek ‘ ’k 0 .
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This is impossible for different k and k 0. On the other hand, for a fixed d, there are only finitely many
finite subsets D0 of D such that d D m(D0). Thus, we obtain that Nd is a finite set of numbers.
For a finite set of natural numbers N , let
Q
i2N Ei be the Cartesian product of the family Ei : i 2 N .
Thus, every f in Qi2N Ei is a function on N and for each i 2 N , we have that f (i) 2 Ei .
Now, we define
N › d D
(
: j(d) [ f:(’n ^ f (n) : n 2 N g
c(d)
flflflflfl f 2Yi2N Ei
)
:
So, given a sequence of formulas fin (n 2 N ) such that for every n 2 N , fin 2 En , we have that
: j(d) [ f:(’n ^ fin : n 2 N g
c(d) 2 N › d:
We have the following observation immediately from the fact that for every natural number j ,’ j 2 E j .
Claim 0. If j 2 N then each default in N › d is not E j -applicable.
Now, consider the default theory (D⁄; ;), where D⁄ is obtained by replacing every default d 2 D by
all defaults in Nd › d; i.e.,
D⁄ D
[
d2D
Nd › d:
It is easy to see the following two claims holding.
Claim 1. For each d 0 2 D⁄, there exists a d 2 D such that j(d) µ j(d 0) and c(d) D c(d 0).
Claim 2. For an arbitrary theory S, if for every k, Ek 6µ S, then for each S-applicable default d 2 D,
there is an S-applicable default d 0 2 D⁄ such that c(d) D c(d 0).
Accordingly, we have that, for an arbitrary theory S,
CnD⁄S (;) µ CnDS (;);
and if E j 6µ S for all js then
CnD⁄S (;) D CnDS (;):
Claim 1 is trivially true. To prove Claim 2, suppose Ek 6µ S for all ks. We must show that for an arbitrary
S-applicable default d 2 D there is S-applicable default d 0 2 D⁄ with c(d 0) D c(d). Let flk 2 Ek ¡ S,
and consider the default
d 0 D : j(d) [ f:(’n ^ fln) : n 2 N g
c(d) :
Then d 0 2 Nd › d µ D⁄ by fln 2 En , and d 0 is S-applicable by fln =2 S; therefore, we have proved
Claim 2.
To complete the whole proof, we want to show that ext(D⁄; ;) D F ¡ fE j : j 2 !g. Since F is
nonincluding, it follows immediately that each T 2 F ¡ fE0; : : : ; E j ; : : :g is an extension of (D⁄; ;)
as CnD⁄T (;) D CnDT (;) D T . Therefore, it suffices to show the following claims:
Claim 3. If E D CnD⁄E (;) then E 2 F .
Claim 4. E j 6D CnD
⁄
E j (;)
To prove Claim 3, suppose E D CnD⁄E (;). If E j 6µ E for all js, then CnD⁄E (;) D CnDE (;) and hence
E is also an extension of (D; ;). Thus, we get E 2 F . Otherwise, for some j , E j µ E . This leads to
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CnDE (;) µ CnDE j (;). As CnD⁄S (;) µ CnDS (;), for an arbitrary theory S, we have that
E j µ E D CnD⁄E (;) µ CnDE (;) µ CnDE j (;) D E j :
Accordingly, E D CnDE (;).
As for Claim 4, it suffices to show ’ j =2 CnD
⁄
E j (;). Suppose not. Then there is a finite subset D0 of
D⁄ such that every default in D0 is E j -applicable and c(D0) ‘ ’ j .
By the definition of D⁄, for each default d 0 2 D⁄ there is a default in D, denoted by Ker(d 0), such
that d 0 is of the form
d 0 D : j(Ker(d
0) [ 0)
c(Ker(d 0))
and for each k 2 NKer(d 0), d 0 is not Ek-applicable. Note also that for an arbitrary set of formulas S, if
Ker(d 0) is S-applicable, so is the default d 0.
Let D00 D fKer(d 0) : d 0 2 D0g. Then all defaults in D00 are E j -applicable since all defaults d 0 2 D0
are E j -applicable. As c(D00) D c(D0) ‘ ’ j , we have that j 2 Nm(D00). It follows that there exists a
default d⁄ 2 D0 such Ker(d⁄) D m(D00), and hence d⁄ is not E j -applicable. This is a contradiction. j
COROLLARY 4.1. Let F be a denumerable family that is representable by a default theory, and let
G µ F . Then G is also representable by a default theory.
We conclude this section with an example of a denumerable family that is supercompactly non-
including (and hence representable) but has not any SSDR; Corollary 4.1 is thus an improvement of
[11, Theorem 4.2].
EXAMPLE 4.1. Let P D fp0; p1; : : :g be a set of propositional atoms. Define Ti D Cn(P ¡ fpi g),
i D 0; 1; : : : ; and T D fTi : i D 0; 1; : : :g.
It is clear that T is countable and supercompactly nonincluding as for each Ti , fpi g is a hitting set
for T ¡fTi g but not for T . Moreover, we show that T has not any SSDR as follows. It suffices to prove
that, for an arbitrary formulas ’, if Ti ‘ ’ holds for some i , then there is another natural number j such
that Tj ‘ ’. By the condition that Ti ‘ ’ and Ti µ Cn(P), we have a finite set S µ P such that S ‘ ’.
The result follows since there are infinitely many Tj s such that S µ Tj .
5. TWO MORE EXAMPLES
In this section, we actually construct two denumerable, representable families. The first family is
not supercompactly nonincluding. The second one consists of mutually inconsistent theories but is not
representable by any normal default theory.
PROPOSITION 5.1. There is a denumerable family that is representable but not supercompactly non-
including.
Proof. Let us construct an example of denumerable, representable families that are not supercom-
pactly nonincluding. Let P D fpi : i 2 !g and Q D fqi : i 2 !g4 be two disjoint sets of propositional
atoms. Define, for every j 2 !;
Sj D fpi : i < jg [ fqi : i ‚ jg
and
F D fCn(Sj ) : j 2 !g [ fCn(P)g:
4 By !, we denote the set of all natural numbers.
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We prove that F is not supercompactly nonincluding as follows. Assuming H is a finite hitting set for
fCn(Sj ) : j 2 !g, we want to show that it is a hitting set for F also. By the finiteness of H , there is
a formula ’ such that ’ 2 Cn(Sj ) for infinitely many Sj s. Let k be a natural number such that those
atoms qi , where i ‚ k, do not occur in ’. Let k 0 ‚ k be such that ’ 2 Cn(Sk 0 ), i.e., Sk 0 ‘ ’. Replacing
qi s, i ‚ k 0 in Sk 0 ‘ ’ by a tautological formula >, we obtain that fpi : i < k 0g ‘ ’ (see the following
remark for the justification of this technique). Hence ’ 2 Cn(P) and H is a hitting set for F .
To complete the proof, we must show thatF is representable. Denoting the set f:qi : i < jg[f:p j g
by 0 j , we define
D D
‰:qi
pi
: i 2 !
¾[‰0i
fi
: i 2 ! and fi 2 Si
¾
:
We now consider the default theory (D; ;). It is easy to check that Cn(P) and Cn(Si )s are extensions
of this default theory, that is, F µ ext(D; ;). On the other hand, we shall prove that F ¶ ext(D; ;),
whence F is representable by (D; ;). Suppose S 2 ext(D; ;), and we want to show S 2 F . Here are
two cases:
Case 1. If qi =2 S for all i’s, then all defaults :qi=ai in D are S-applicable; hence pi 2 CnDS (;) D
S. Accordingly, Cn(P) µ S, which leads to Cn(P) D S since extensions of a default theory are
nonincluding.
Case 2. If there exists an i such that qi 2 S, then let n be the least such one. Since :qn 2 0i for all
i > n, we have that all S-applicable defaults in D fall into the set
D0 D
‰:qi
pi
: i 6D n
¾[‰0i
fi
: i • n and fi 2 Si
¾
:
Thus S D CnDS (;) µ Cn(c(D0)). Clearly c(D0) 6‘ pn and hence S 6‘ pn . Thus the defaults 0n=fi, where
fi 2 Sn , are S-applicable, which leads to that S D CnDS (;) ¶ Sn . It follows that S D Sn .
In both cases, S is in F , so we have proved the result of (b). j
Remark. In the proof above, there is a maneuver of replacing p j by > (true) and then inferring
something. The justification for this technique is as follows:
Given an arbitrary set S of propositional formulas, propositional formulas ’ and fi, and primitive
formula p, by ’( p
fi
) we denote the formula obtained from ’ by replacing each occurrence of p with fi.
By S( p
fi
) we denote the set f`( p
fi
) j ` 2 Sg. “Replacing p in the provability relation S jD ’ with fi”
results in the provability relation S( p
fi
) jD ’( p
fi
). What we want to show here is that S jD ’ implies that
S( p
fi
) jD ’( p
fi
).
By the replacement theorem for propositional calculus, jD ’ implies that jD ’( p
fi
), and S jD ’
iff there are fi1; : : : fin 2 S such that jD (fi1^; : : : ;^fin)!’, which by the same reason implies that
jD ((fi1^; : : : ;^fin)! ’)( pfi ); that is, jD (fi1( pfi )^; : : : ;^fin( pfi ))! ’( pfi ), implying that S( pfi ) jD ’( pfi ).
PROPOSITION 5.2. There is a denumerable family of mutually inconsistent theories F such that F is
representable by a default theory but not by any normal default theory.
This proposition is significant in that it guarantees the existence of such a default theory that has
exactly infinitely many, mutually inconsistent extensions but fails to be representable in the class of
normal default theories, which gives a negative answer to the question of Marek and Truszczyn´ski
as to whether the following proposition holds without the assumption that the extensions are finitely
generated [9, p. 130].
PROPOSITION 5.3 [9, COROLLARY 5.10]. If a default theory (D;W ) has at least one extension and all
the extensions for (D;W ) are finitely generated and pairwise inconsistent, then the default theory is
representable in the class of normal default theories.
As mentioned in the introduction, Marek et al. [11] constructed an example of a denumerable family
of pairwise inconsistent theories that are not representable by normal default theories. However, their
example is not representable by any default theory and thus does not answer the question above.
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To prove Propositon 5.2, we present our counterexample as follows:
EXAMPLE 5.1.5 Let qi s, p j s, and ai j s (i • j) be different atoms, and let
W0 D fqi ! :p j j i 6D jg
and for i < j ,
a ji D :ai j :
Then, we define
E j D Cn(W0 [ fp j g [ fai j j i 2 !g);
for all j 2 !; and
E D fE j j j 2 !g:
It is clear that E is denumerable and consists of mutually inconsistent theories. In addition, E is
supercompactly nonincluding and hence representable, because for each E j in E , f:q j g is a hitting set
for E ¡ fE j g but not for E . It remains to show that E is not representable by any normal default theory.
For this purpose, we must get some essential properties to distinguish the family E from those families
representable by normal default theories. Fortunately, the next lemma gives an important feature of
those families that are representable by normal default theories, and Lemma 5.2 guarantees that our
family E does not share this very feature.
LEMMA 5.1. Let (D;W ) be a normal default theory, then for all extensions E , E 0 of (D;W ) such
that E 6D E 0 there is a sentence fi such that fi 2 E and E 0 [ ffig is inconsistent, and for every extension
E⁄ of (D;W ), either fi 2 E⁄ or E⁄ [ ffig is inconsistent.
The proof of this lemma is omitted here. It can be inferred easily from the complete representability
result for normal default theories obtained by Marek et al. [11] that a family T of theories in L is
representable by a normal default theory if and only if T D L or there is a set of formulas 9 such that
T D fCn(8) : 8 µ 9 is maximal so that 8 is consistentg.
Lemma 5.1, which gives a new essential feature of normal default theories, is closely related to
Reiter’s corresponding result [12, Theorem 3.3], i.e., the inconsistency of any two extensions of normal
default theory, which says that there is a sentence fi in one extension but the negation of the sentence
is in the other. Somewhat stronger than Reiter’s theorem, our theorem says that this sentence fi can
be such one as if :fi
fi
were a default of the default theory being considered; in other words, for every
extension E⁄, the consistency of E⁄ [ ffig implies fi 2 E⁄.
LEMMA 5.2. Let E j s be as in Example 5.1, ° an arbitrary sentence such that ° 2 E0, and:° 2 E1.
Then there is an Ei such that ° 62 Ei and :° 62 Ei .
The proof of this lemma is omitted also.
6. CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
The representability theory is of key importance for default logic. Representability by certain classes
of default theories provides insights into the expressive power of the corresponding branches of default
logic. This kind of study will be helpful for users to find simpler representation for their default theories.
The usefulness of Reiter’s default logic for specifying multiple belief sets of an agent was investigated
by Marek et al. [11]. However, they did not find a complete characterization of families of theories that
are representable by general default theories. This paper has given a new necessary condition for the
5 This example was previously presented as a default theory in [14].
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representability by means of general default theories and presented several sufficient conditions that
are weaker than similar ones known previously. Moreover, this paper has improved some interesting
results of [11]. For example, Marek et al. showed that every subfamily of a representable family that
has an SSDR that is representable, whereas we have obtained that every subfamily of a denumerable
representable family is representable. Our result is more satisfying in that an arbitrary family that has
an SSDR must be denumerable.
It is well known that there exists an extension and two different extensions are inconsistent for every
normal default theory (i.e., the existence and orthogonality of extensions, see [12, Theorems 3.1 and
3.3]). In this paper, we have given a new feature of extensions of a normal default theory, by which we
show that our example of a denumerable, representable family of mutually inconsistent theories is not
presentable by any normal default theory.
However, we have not found some essential and distinguishing features for other important classes
of default theories, such as the class of semi-normal default theories [7], and the class of unitary default
theories (i.e., the class of those default theories in which each default has exactly one justification). The
following problems seem more difficult and remain open:
Problem 1: Is each default theory equivalent to a semi-normal default theory?
Problem 2: Is each default theory equivalent to a unitary default theory?
Problem 3: Is each unitary default theory equivalent to a semi-normal default theory?
We note that if Problem 1 or Problem 2 has an affirmative answer, then, from a representation
viewpoint, the user is allowed to characterize families of belief sets for his/her agents by using only
semi-normal default theories or unitary default theories instead of general ones.
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